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From 1991 to 2001, donor aid to African agriculture fell substantially—from about USD 
1.7 billion to USD 1 billion. The sharply reduced level of aid to agriculture is distressing 
given the persistent poverty in Africa, and the large, potential contribution of agriculture 
to economic growth and poverty reduction. This paper draws on OECD data to examine 
what has happened to aid in Africa, both across sectors and within agriculture over the 
past 10 to 15 years. A disaggregation of aid to agriculture reveals that from 1981 to 
2001, donor support for food crops declined from 13 to 4 percent and aid to export crops 
declined from 16 to 2 percent of total lending to agriculture. However, aid to the social 
service sectors doubled from 23 percent in 1976 to 56 percent in 2001. Likewise food aid 
and emergency assistance almost doubled in both relative and absolute terms from 1991 
to 2001.  
 
The authors argue that the reasons for the large decline in donor aid to agriculture lie 
not only in the high failure rate of many agriculture projects from the 1960s to the 1980s 
but also urban bias and the neglect of agriculture by African countries themselves. 
Additional reasons for the decline include the incongruous subsidies and protectionist 
policies of DAC countries, a shift in lending to rural education and public health and the 
declining influence of the agricultural lobby in DAC countries and the sharp decline in 
agricultural expertise in donor agencies. The major challenges to increasing aid flows to 
agriculture include: improving the policy coherence between domestic economic policies 
of developed countries and donor policies, and redressing the imbalance between the 
rapid growth in aid to rural social services and food aid and the sharp decline in public 
investments in rural roads, human capital, research and capacity building. Additional 
challenges include mobilizing the support of both donors and African countries for 
investments in high potential agricultural areas; and revising the modalities used to 
deliver aid to agriculture. The authors argue that a development strategy based on rural 
social services and food aid represents a narrow and inefficient approach to poverty 
reduction in Africa   
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I) INTRODUCTION: THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT IN 
AFRICA 
In the early 1990s, the development community was forcefully warned that the declining 
support to agriculture in developing counties must urgently be reversed if problems 
associated with rural employment, food production, and protection of the environment 
were to be effectively addressed (Paarlberg and Lipton, 1991 and Von Braun et al. 1993). 
This reversal has not happened. Over the 1990’s alone, aid to Africa agriculture has 
halved from about 2 billion dollars to approximately 1 billion dollars (Figure 1). Given 
the well-documented and critical role of agriculture in economic development and 
poverty reduction,
1 it is no surprise to hear the proposition that insufficient aid to the 
agriculture sector has been a critical factor underlying the disappointing progress in 
Africa. Indeed, given that other regions that have experienced sustained periods of 
agricultural growth have witnessed corresponding declines in poverty, the co-existence of 
poor agriculture sector performance in Africa with substantial and persistent poverty in 
the region does not seem an anomaly. Progress towards economic development and 
poverty reduction in general, and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s) in 
particular, has lagged that in other regions and has actually regressed on many fronts. 
Export revenues and market shares have fallen, per capita incomes have declined, 
famines are common, environmental degradation continues, and the incidence of 
malnutrition is rising (Table 1).  
Table 1. Agriculture and Development by characteristics region; 2000 
 
  Development indicators  Agriculture indicators 
  Poverty at the $1/day 
level (%) 
Malnourished (%)  Yields (Cereals, 
aggregate) t/Ha 
Export Value (current 
USD, billion) 
       
LAC
1  11 (+16)  10 (-9)  2.9 (+37)  49 (+40) 
East Asia  15 (-44)  11 (-23)  3.4 (+18)  26.7 (+43) 
South Asia  32 (-7)  22 (<+1)  2.9 (+24)  7.2 (+43) 
SSA
2  49 (+34)  33 (+16)  1.2 (+7)  13.8 (+13) 
       
Numbers in parenthesis indicate the percentage change in absolute values over the period 1990-2000 
 
1 Latin America and Caribbean  
2 Sub-Sahara Africa 
Source: FAOSTAT, 2003; GPM, 2003; FAO, 2003 
  
Indeed, many argue that donors are failing to put forward the needed effort to reduce 
hunger and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa (Mellor, 1998). What’s more, the “picture in   
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agriculture is particularly ugly” and far too little assistance is aimed at agriculture and 
rural development (Global Governance Initiative, 2004). While aid to agriculture in 
Africa increased substantially prior to the mid 1980’s, over the last 15 years, aid to 
agriculture has fallen substantially in absolute and relative terms (Figure 1). 








































































































Source: OECD CRS Data are 3-year moving averages
 
 
This paper focuses on aid to agriculture, because donor aid to agriculture in Africa was 
almost cut in half in the 1990’s, and because agriculture has a critical role to play in 
sustained poverty reduction. While improved rural social services are undoubtedly 
necessary, they are far from sufficient to enable African people to improve their 
livelihoods. About two thirds of Africa’s population live in rural areas, and it is rural 
areas where the incidence and severity of poverty is greatest. Agriculture contributes 
about 20 percent of the region’s GDP, and employment in farm and rural non-farm 
sectors is often as high as 70 to 80 percent of the total workforce.     
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II) AID TO AFRICAN AGRICULTURE: THE DATA 
This paper uses the OECD’s definition of agriculture
2 and analyzes the trends, issues, and 
challenges surrounding aid to African agriculture.
3 The specific objectives of the paper 
are to i) quantify the characteristics of, and the trends in development assistance to 
agriculture in Africa, in terms of donors, recipients, and sub-sectors, ii) assess these 
changes relative to those in other sectors, and to non-sectoral assistance, iii) analyze the 
causes of these patterns, and the challenges to increasing donor aid to agriculture and iv) 
identify areas where improved tracking of aid flows is needed.  
 
In seeking to find answers for these questions, OECD’s Creditor Reporting System 
(CRS) database is used as the basic source of information to analyze aid commitments 
broken down to the country (regional) level beginning in 1973 and ending in 2002.
4 
Three-year moving averages are generally used as the basis of analysis to even out the 
“lumpiness” of commitments (For example, 2001 represents an average of commitments 
for the years of 2001 and 2002). There are, however, several limitations to the use of 
CRS data.
5 Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, CRS is the best available data 
resource, and despite its limitations, it is used as the basis of this study with 
supplementary statistics from other agencies where necessary and possible.
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III) TRENDS IN AID TO AFRICAN AGRICULTURE 
Over the last decade, African development has been slow, as has growth in the 
agriculture sector. GDP growth rates (3.2 percent p.a.) have been modest, and the 
percentage of people living on less than one dollar per day has increased by 21 percent 
(by 34 percent in absolute terms, or a massive 67 million – the single largest increase 
across all regions). At the same time, growth in agriculture GDP has been a modest 2.5 
percent per annum between 1991 and 2001, and other measures such as crop yields and 
yield growth rates, and share of international trade in agricultural products, indicate that 
development of the agriculture sector has lagged that of other regions (World Bank 
2003).  
Why has progress in agricultural growth and combating hunger and poverty in Africa 
been so lackluster? Is the slowdown in aid the culprit? These are fundamental questions   
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because the direction of causality is unclear. Did agricultural growth falter due to 
declining aid starting in the mid eighties or did aid fall in response to several decades of  
poor agricultural performance because of mismanagement, corruption and the 
exploitative policies of African governments? Many identify political instability and 
point out that 30 African nations experienced 80 successful military coups from 1956 to 
2001 (McGowan 2003 in Collier 2003). Some argue that the poor performance of 
previous investments in Africa in the sixties and seventies agriculture led to a withdrawal 
of donor aid from the mid eighties throughout the nineties. Many Africans contend that 
the culprit is the cumulative effect of the adoption of inappropriate agricultural 
institutions from industrial countries. We shall address these issues below because it is 
unclear whether the causality of poor agricultural performance runs from reduced donor 
aid or from poor African agricultural policies. Finally we shall address the African/Asian 
aid paradox: why did the drop-off in aid to African agriculture occur, ironically, right 
after Africa’s 1984/85 famines, whereas there was huge increase in aid to agriculture in 
India and other Asian countries just after India’s food crisis of the mid-sixties (OECD 
1968, 2001).  
 
Total ODA (Official Development Assistance)
7 grew at a phenomenal rate of 14 percent 
per annum in the 1970s but it fell to 8.4 percent in the 1980s and an average rate of 1 
percent per year in the 1990s (Odedokun, 2003). However, because of the success of the 
Green Revolution in Asia in the seventies and eighties, donor aid to agriculture in 
developing countries started to decline in the mid-eighties, followed by the unexpected 
decline in donor aid to agriculture in Africa in the late 1980’s and throughout the 1990s. 
In 2003 total World Bank lending for agriculture was just 8 percent of total Bank lending, 
an all time low (Cleaver 2003). Looking back, Yudelman (1985) reminds us that; 
 
… between 1949 and 1984, the Bank shifted from a policy of “benign 
neglect” of agriculture to one that led it to become the world’s single largest 
source of external capital for investing in agriculture in developing countries.  
Lending for agriculture grew from around 6 percent of total Bank lending 
through the early 1960s to over 30 percent of a much larger total by the mid-
70s. Indeed, agricultural commitments between 1974 and 1984 totaled more 
than $30 billion – by far the largest single component in the Bank’s portfolio.   
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With regards to Africa, while the share of total aid committed to agriculture rose 
significantly over the 1970’s and early 1980’s, since the late 1980’s assistance to the 
sector has fallen steadily (Table 2). 
Table 2. Africa in the global context: Aid and agriculture, 1971-2001 
  1971 1981 1991 2001 
Total Aid (2001$US million)      
  Developing  Countries  26015*  36195 46252 54085 
 Sub-Saharan  Africa  4992*  8883  13025  16038 
    Africa as a percent of total  19*  25  28  30 
      
Aid to Agriculture as a % of total         
 Global  16*  22  13  6 
 Africa  11*  18  12  6 
       
Rural population (% of total)         
  Low  &  middle  income  72 68 63 58 
  Sub-Saharan  Africa  83 79 74 67 
      
Agriculture Value added (% of GDP)         
  Low  &  middle  income  23 19 16 12 
  Sub-Saharan  Africa  21 18 18 18 
      
Aid/capita  (current  US$)      
  Low & middle income  2  8  14  12 
  Sub-Saharan  Africa  4  20 35 23 
      
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$)          
  Low & middle income  243  777  893  1163 
  Sub-Saharan  Africa  220 670 553 467 
    Africa as a percent of total  90  86  62  40 
      
*  1974  values      
Source: DAC, CRS, World Bank, 2003      
 
While agriculture is a much larger part of Africa’s economy than it is in other regions, 
agriculture is getting the same allocation of aid relative to total aid flows. Also, while 
declining aid to agriculture can be, to a lesser or greater extent, justified as a country 
develops (due to the falling relative importance of agriculture in an industrializing 
economy), the rate of decline has matched that of the overall developing country average 
despite considerably slower improvement in development indicators. Of course, poor 
performance in the agriculture sector cannot be attributed to lower aid to agriculture 
alone—other factors at play have an important role (including falling commodity prices, 
climate change, technological change, shifts in demand, and political instability).
8 As   
  9
discussed later, however, many of these (such as trade barriers and food aid distortions) 
are linked to agricultural subsidies and trade policies of developed countries. 
Aid to agriculture: Africa’s overall development assistance context 
In the broad perspective of donor assistance in Africa, total sector allocable aid has 
fluctuated around 70 percent of total ODA (this being in contrast to the global average, 
which has increased from 59 to 70 percent).
 9 Commodity aid and general programmatic 
assistance increased from 13 to 24 percent between 1976 and 1986, but has since fallen to 
18 percent. This later fall has been offset by a tripling of debt relief (from 4 to 11 percent 
between 1986 and 2001). ‘Emergency assistance’ and ‘unspecified’ have both remained 
significant, though variable, over the time period (Table 3). 
Table 3. African Aid by classification: 1976-2001 
  1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 
          
Total  sector  allocable  79 73 69 67 70 63 
General  programmatic  assistance  13 20 24 19 14 18 
Debt  relief  1 4 4 9 8  11 
Emergency  assistance  2 2 2 3 6 6 
Support  to  NGO’s  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unallocated/unspecified  5 1 0 2 1 1 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 
        
Total (million 2001 $US)   5,090  8,883  11,391  13,025  9,563  15,749 
        
Source: OECD CRS Database        
 
Table 4 reveals that aid to African agriculture, including forestry and fishing, has 
declined from 29 percent in 1981 to 19 percent in 1991 and to 10 percent in 2001. 
Economic infrastructure, including transport and storage, energy, and communications, 
has faced a similar reduction, falling from 31 to 19 percent over the same period. Again, 
one might expect that these shifts reflect donor cutbacks in areas where the private sector 
(e.g. agribusiness and research), would presumably invest. However, given that the 
‘enabling environment’ in rural Africa does not yet provide adequate incentives for the 
private sector, there has been relatively little private investment in agricultural research 
and extension.
10    
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 Table 4. Allocation of sector allocable aid to Africa: 1976-2001 
  1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 
        
Social Infrastructure & Services  23  22  23  32  45  56 
Economic  Infrastructure  38 31 31 28 25 19 
Agriculture - Forestry - Fishing, Total  25  29  27  19  14  10 
Other  Production  Sectors  7 8 9 7 3 3 
Multisector 7  9  11  14  12  12 
Total Sector Allocable  100 100 100 100 100 100 
        
Total Sector Allocable (million 2001 $US)  4,014  6,517  7,808  8,747  6,741  9,957 
        
Source: OECD CRS Database        
 
The most notable increase in aid to Africa has been in the social infrastructure and 
services sector, which has more than doubled from 23 percent in 1976 to 56 percent in 
2001. Indeed, from 1976 to 1991 there was an almost exact one for one decrease in 
agriculture aid for each increase in social infrastructure and services. Also increasing by 
almost twofold is allocations to multisector category, increasing from 7 to 12 percent.
11 
This dramatic increase in donor investment in the social services sector will be discussed 
below.  
Changes by donor 
In absolute terms, assistance provided to African agriculture has declined steadily over 
the 1990’s for both bilateral and multilateral donors (Table 5). Further, the contribution 
provided by each donor has declined markedly relative to the total aid it provided to 
Africa, and this decline is actually greater than the average for donor aid to all developing 
countries.  
Table 5. Aid to agriculture by DAC countries and Multilaterals; 1981-2001 
 
Aid to Agriculture (Global) 
(percent of donor total) 
Aid to African Agriculture 
(US$ million 2001) 
Aid to African agriculture as 
a % of that donor’s total aid 
to Africa 
  1981 1991 2001 1981 1991 2001 1981 1991 2001 
           
DAC Countries   11  8  5  833  1047  557  15  12  6 
Multilateral    33 22  8  1,089  640  440  32 14  7 
Donors  Total 18 12  6  1,921  1,687  997  22 13  6 
           
Source: OECD CRS Database 
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The relative contributions among donors have also changed. France, the largest bilateral 
donor in 1980, halved its aid to Africa over the last two decades. The US and Japan 
remain important donors (109 and 95 million dollars respectively in 2001), though, as for 
all the major donors, commitments to African agriculture have fallen considerably over 
the last two decades. Although the proportion that each donor allocates to agriculture has 
generally fallen across the board, some donors obviously view agriculture as a much 
more important avenue to development than do other donors (Table 6). Political agendas 
also motivate resource allocations to a specific sector as well as food aid. Also, there are 
certain anomalies that are pertinent to this study. Can it be correct that aid flows from 
France and the UK have actually declined to the extent that these figures indicate?  
Table 6. Aid to African Agriculture: the largest donors in 1980 and 2000 
 
 




Donor’s aid to 
African agriculture as 
a % of their total aid  
to Africa 
Donor contribution   
to African agriculture 
aid as a % of total
1 
Total donor aid as % 
of donors GDP 
------------------------------------------------------1981-------------------------------------------------- 
United States  232  20  12  0.15 
France 155  21  8  0.30 
Japan 129  24  7  0.13 
Denmark 50  27 3  0.31 
Sweden 49  16  3  0.45 
------------------------------------------------------2001-------------------------------------------------- 
United States  109  6  11  0.14 
Japan 95  16  10  0.25 
France 73  5  7  0.27 
Denmark 40  13 4  0.73 
Germany 36 5  4  0.23 
      
1Donor contribution to African agriculture aid as a % of total aid to African agriculture 
Source: OECD CRS Database; World Bank WDI 
 
Also, the number of agricultural development staff in donor organizations has fallen over 
the past 10 to 15 years. USAID’s global agricultural staff has fallen from about 250 in 
1985 to less than 50 in 2003 (USAID, 2003 in Eicher, 2003). In 2003 USAID had only 
ten agricultural specialists in Africa to serve its 23 missions and three regional offices. 
Similar trends are apparent in other multilateral and bilateral agencies. Internal 
reorganizations, and pressures to cut down on staff time and costs, has marginalized 
agricultural experts, while movements to structural adjustment lending have reduced the 
number of agricultural projects and specialized staff to identify and design agricultural 
projects.   
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Changes by recipient 
Who should get foreign aid? This was one of the major questions raised about foreign aid 
in the 1950’s. Some economists emphasized absorptive capacity as the criterion for 
receiving aid, while others emphasized good performance in terms of social and 
economic policies and balance of payment needs. But at the end of the day, the prize 
went to poverty, giving proportionally more to the poor countries. The UN then made a 
list of the twenty-five least-developed countries and requested that aid agencies give 
priority to these twenty-five (Lewis, 1984). But the poverty issue was swept aside at 
Africa’s independence, as most new nations focused on economic growth rather than 
alleviating poverty. The poverty debate surfaced two decades later as part of the donor 
shift to integrated rural development in the early seventies and then again to poverty 
alleviation in the nineties. Today, the debate over how to rank countries to receive aid 
from the Millennium Challenge Account covers the same ground that the UN addressed 
some 50 years ago (Radelet 2003). 
 
There is considerable variation in the levels of aid going to African countries, not only in 
absolute terms, but also relative to the size of the sector, the importance of agriculture, 
and the need for agricultural development aid. Table 7 shows that the amount of aid 
allocated to the recipients that receive the highest aid for agriculture are smaller now than 
it was 20 years ago, that this aid as a proportion of the total aid to these countries is 
generally less than half, and that the poorest countries are not necessarily receiving the 
most aid on a per capita basis.
12  




(US $ million) 
 
Aid/capita ($)
Ag ODA as % 
of Total to 
SSA 
Ag ODA as % 
total to 
country 
GNI per capita 
(Atlas $) 
------------------------------------------------------1981----------------------------------------------------
Sudan 228  33  12  28  473 
Tanzania 159  36  8  19  - 
Kenya 124  26  7  21  427 
Senegal 111  55  6  31  507 
Zambia 80  49  4  21  660 
------------------------------------------------------2001----------------------------------------------------
Uganda 78  33  8  9  263 
Tanzania 72  34  8  6  275 
Ghana 72  32  7  11  300 
Ethiopia 60  16  6  6  100 
Mali 51  36  5  11  240 
       
Source: OECD CRS Database; World Bank WDI 2003   
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Changes by Agricultural sub-sector 
Table 8 shows that, there have been some striking changes over the last three decades in 
the distribution of aid among sub sectors within agriculture in Africa (Table 8). Most 
notable has been the increase in aid to the ‘agricultural policy and administration 
management’ subsector.
13 This is most likely a reflection of the structural adjustment 
programs of the 1980’s and 1990’s. It might also reflect the move from discrete project 
aid to programmatic forms—separate identification of components of wider sector 
programmes not being possible (DAC, 2004).
14 Another other notable increase has been 
that of the ‘fishery’ and ‘forestry’ subsectors; together these now account for about one 
fifth of aid to the agriculture (and fisheries and forestry) sector. This is in line with the 
Brundtland report (Our Common Future) that encouraged donors to devote more 
attention to natural resources (World Commission on Environment and Development, 
1987). 
 
Table 8. Aid to African agriculture by subsector: 1981-2001 
  Subsectoral allocation as % of total 
  1981 1991 2001 
Agricultural Policy & Administrative Management  4  16  27
2 
Agricultural Development  17  9  8 
Agricultural Inputs  3  3  7 
Agricultural Research
1 7  14  7 
Agricultural Water Resources  9  6  7 
Livestock 5  3  5 
Food Crop Production  13  2  4 
Industrial Crops/Export Crops  16  6  2 
Other agriculture  12  27  12 
Grand Total (agriculture, fish, forestry)  100  100  100 
     
Fish And Forestry - Total  13  14  20 
Agriculture - Total  87  86  79 
     
1Includes livestock research, and agricultural research, extension, and education/training. 
2 Because of the shift from project to programme aid by many donors it is not possible to list each 
component of wider sector programmes. This may explain the increase in the share of “agricultural policy 
and development.”  Global aid for the provision of agricultural inputs, agricultural services and agricultural 
education/research has halved in real terms over the last 20 years. 
Source: OECD CRS Database      
 
Table 8 also shows that the biggest losers in Africa over the 1980 to 2000 period have 
been the Food Crop Production and Industrial Crops/Export Crops sub sectors. The sharp 
drop in donor aid to food production, from 13 percent in 1981 to 4 percent in 2001, is a   
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special concern because of Africa’s structural food deficit and the importance of food 
crop production for home consumption or local sale for the millions of smallholders.
15 
Likewise, the sharp reduction in donor support for export crops from 16 percent in 1980 
to 2 percent in 2000 reflects donor concern over the corruption and inefficiency of 
marketing boards, falling commodity prices and subsidies and trade barriers in industrial 
countries. For example, some African governments destroyed cooperatives and imposed 
extortion levels of taxes on agricultural exports by paying farmers a fraction of the export 
price in order to build up a “slush fund” to build government hotels, new airports and 
other symbols of a modern nation. These harsh taxes encouraged illegal cross-border 
trade and dampened the spread of new technology. Two case studies illustrate the 
draconian policies against export crops. In the mid eighties Tanzania abolished 
cooperatives because they were considered a threat to the ruling party and taxed 
smallholder coffee farmers by paying them only 23 percent of the export price of coffee 
(Tweeten 1989). Malawi provides another example of the power of the state to squeeze 
farmers. Before Malawi won its independence from the British in 1964, smallholders 
exported their own coffee through village level cooperatives and a regional cooperative 
union. But the new government abolished the cooperative union and set up a government 
corporation – a Smallholder Coffee Authority – that assumed direct control of coffee 
processing at 27 village pulpery sites. In August 1994, the Coffee Authority paid farmers 
US $0.43 per kilo of coffee or only 10 percent of the then New York spot price of US 
$4.24 per kilo.
16  
Other official flows 
Finally, there are flows that have not been accounted for in the above description of aid to 
agriculture. These are those that are relevant but fall outside the DAC definition that ‘aid’ 
must include a grant element of at least 25 percent. Other official flows
17 (those that do 
not meet the criteria of OECDs definition of ODA) have represented about 20 percent of 
the value of ODA over the last decade. Although data is not available at the regional 
level, technical cooperation flows have remained consistent at about 30 percent of ODA 
to agriculture in all developing countries.
18 
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IV) WHAT EXPLAINS THE DECLINE? 
Paarlberg and Lipton (1991) presented eight reasons for the decline in the World Bank’s 
global lending to agriculture in the 1980s: industrialization and urbanization, pressure 
from donor countries to reduce support to developing country farmers that might compete 
with their own producers, reluctance of client countries to identify and prepare rural 
development, the relatively high failure rate of agricultural projects, declining commodity 
prices, and the shift away from projects towards macroeconomic policy reform. But, the 
aid environment is much more complex in Africa today than in the global aid arena in the 
1980s.
19 The explosion of donor agencies, donor projects (Morss 1984) and NGOs has 
contributed to difficulties in coordinating aid activities, reduced clarity of aid 
effectiveness, and policy incoherence. 
 
Eight issues help explain why aid to African agriculture has declined over the past 15 to 
17 years.   
Africa’s reluctant commitment to agriculture 
The first reason for the decline in donor aid is caused by African priorities being directed 
to industrialization and urbanization (Lipton 1977) and the consistent lack of African 
pressure on donors to invest in agriculture. A simple African and Asian comparison 
highlights this point. African public expenditure on agriculture has been low and around 
one half the level in Asian countries in the seventies and eighties.
20 Public resource flows 
to agriculture vary both between countries and across time, ranging from about 5 to 6 
percent of total government outlays in many countries (Table 9). Ghana, now one of 
Africa’s biggest recipients of aid to agriculture, reduced its outlays to agriculture from 
about 10 percent in the early 1980s to about 5 percent in the early 1990s. This likely 
reflects the fungibility of monetary resources, in the context of international 
development, as shown by Devarajan et al, (2001). In many cases, these figures may 
overstate flows of public resources to agriculture due to a net taxation of the sector via 
overvalued exchange rates (these having been partially corrected for via subsidies and, in 
more recent years, through structural adjustment programs).    
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Table 9 Composition of total public expenditure, 1980 and 1998 (percent) 




  1980 1998 1980 1998 1980 1998 
        
Agriculture  6  5 15  10 8  3 
Education  12 16 14 20 16 19 
Health  3 5 5 4 4 7 
T&C  6  4 12 5 11 6 
Social  Security  5 3 4 3  19  26 
Defence  12 10 18 11  7  7 
Other  55 57 33 47 35 32 
  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Fan and Rao 2003 (p8)             
 
This neglect of agriculture by African governments has been a recurring trait of Africa’s 
four decades of independence. Three reasons help explain this neglect. First, development 
thinking in industrial and in newly independent countries in Asia and Africa in the 1950s 
and early 1960s did not view agriculture as an important contributor to economic growth 
(Johnston and Mellor, 1961; Staatz and Eicher 1998). Second, at the beginning of 
Africa’s independence in the late fifties and early sixties, the absence of an African food 
crisis
21 and a fervent belief in industrialization as the engine of development, help explain 
why many of Africa’s new leaders and their policy advisors shunned agriculture and 
announced bold plans to build government steel mills and bicycle factories and catch up 
with industrial nations by the year 2000. Third, food aid helped fill food gaps and 
allowed many African Ministers of Finance to avoid or postpone investments in physical 
infrastructure, research, extension and agricultural higher education (FAO, 1978).  
 
Donor Response to Food Crises in Asia and Africa 
A major turning point in Africa’s food outlook occurred in 1984-1985, when a million 
people died in the horrendous famine in Ethiopia. This event mobilized world opinion for 
increased food aid and alerted African governments that Ethiopia and many other African 
countries were facing a long-term food deficit comparable to India’s crisis of the sixties. 
Nevertheless, Table 4 has shown that donors actually reduced lending to agriculture from 
27 percent of allocable aid to Africa in 1986 to 19 percent in 1991 and to 10 percent in 
2001. These data raise a fundamental question: why did donors increase their investment 
in agriculture in Asia following India’s food crisis in the mid 1960s and reduce their 
overall support for agriculture in Africa starting in 1986? The answer is that donors   
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increased aid to agriculture in Asia because of the startling success of the high yielding 
wheat and rice varieties that became available in the mid sixties. By contrast the high 
failure rate of agricultural projects and programs during Africa’s first 25 years of 
independence (1960-85) contributed to donor skepticism about African agriculture and 
ironically led to a decline in donor aid to African agriculture following Africa’s famines 
of 1984 and 1985.  
 
To summarize, African political leaders and policy makers have been reluctant to commit 
to long-term agricultural investments that are needed to transform Africa’s smallholder 
agriculture into a productive sector that can provide satisfactory livelihoods for Africa’s 
400 million people living in rural areas as well as providing affordable food to the 227 
million urban consumers. Since donors are increasingly allocating their resources to 
Africa on a ‘demand-driven’ basis, Africa’s ambivalent position on agriculture has 
contributed to a decline in donor investments in agriculture. Fortunately, NEPAD (New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development) is calling for a mutual agreement among African 
governments and donor nations to elevate the priority to long-term public investments in 
physical infrastructure, agricultural research and agricultural universities.  
The changing whims of donors and  poor performance of agricultural projects  
The third reason for the decline in donor aid is linked to ignorance among African 
planners, donors and academics on how to design productive agricultural strategies, 
programs and projects. Both academics and donors have displayed their ignorance by 
routinely changing their focus from institution building of the 1960’s, to the integrated 
rural development of the 1970’s (McNamara, 1973), structural adjustment of the 1980’s 
(World Bank, 1981), natural resource management, privatization, and poverty alleviation 
of the 1990’s, and to the bottom up development, farmer empowerment, and community 
driven and community based development (CDD/CBD) of the late 1990’s and early 
2000’s (Mansuri and Rao, 2004).
22 During the eighties it became obvious that a large 
number of uncoordinated donor projects were poorly designed and had unacceptably low 
rates of return.
23 However, the lack of payoff in the investments in many agricultural 
projects can be partially attributed to the falling real world prices for food grain and the 
failure of imported models of food production and agricultural institutions.  
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Uma Lele (1991) distilled the successes and failures in agricultural lending in three 
countries in East Africa and three in West Africa from the mid-sixties to the mid-eighties; 
she concluded that after nearly two decades of massive donor support for smallholder 
agriculture and broad policy reforms in the six countries, these efforts had limited effect. 
Lele concluded that institutional and technological problems remained by far the greatest 
impediment to agricultural growth, and that the World Bank did not have a consistent 
agricultural-led strategy for long-term growth in Africa. To summarize, many donors 
have promoted institutions and farm production models that have worked in other 
countries, but were found to be inappropriate in the African context (American style land-
grant universities, livestock ranches, credit programs, the Asian Green Revolution model 
and the training and visit (T&V) extension models are all examples). Most of these 
imported models, however, had a short time horizon, unrealistic expectations, and were 
seldom put in the field for adequate pilot testing and redesign. The failure of past 
initiatives in agriculture led to a reduced confidence among donors in agriculture in the 
1980s as an avenue for generating economic growth and poverty reduction, and many 
donors have since turned to other sectors. 
24   
 
Compared to most other sectors, effective investments in agriculture for poverty 
reduction are relatively complicated, and sustained efforts are required over a long time 
horizon to derive substantial, visible and sustainable benefits.  For example, it normally 
takes around a decade of research to develop and farmer-test a new crop variety, and in 
many cases it takes longer. In Zimbabwe it took 28 years (1932 – 1960) to develop the 
famous SR-52 maize hybrid. Donor uneasiness about long gestation investments in 
agriculture has increased in recent years as a result of falling real commodity prices,
25 the 
rise of complex supply chains and multinationals, and a negative stigma associated with 
‘agriculture’ with regards to its relationship with the natural environment (the potential 
‘win-win’ opportunities for agricultural development and environmental enhancement are 
typically overlooked by the development community at large). 
 
Nevertheless, the knowledge base on how to “get agriculture moving” in Africa has 
increased substantially in Africa’s four decades of independence. Haggblade et al (2003) 
have summarized some of Africa’s agricultural success stories: smallholder cotton 
production in West, East, and South Africa, smallholder dairy production (in Kenya),   
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cassava in West and East Africa
26 and horticultural exports in Kenya and the Ivory Coast. 
But there is now a need for more research on the institutional innovations for the core 
agricultural institutions (research, extension and agricultural universities) in anglophone, 
francophone and lusophone Africa (Hoff 2003). 
 
NGO Pressure to Increase Rural Social Services 
The fourth reason for the decline involves a battle between the agricultural lobby and the 
NGO pressure groups to expand rural social services. During the Green Revolution era in 
Asia in the sixties and seventies, development professionals in foundations, universities 
and consulting firms in DAC countries formed coalitions and lobbied to increase aid for 
agriculture, health and education across the board. But these coalitions dissolved in the 
eighties and nineties and were replaced by a highly competitive relationship between 
advocates of investments in social services versus those in agriculture (Atwood 2002). 
Without question, the era of competition has been fueled by declining total aid budgets to 
Africa. The health and education lobbies have been the clear winners as they have 
increased their share of aid to Africa. The ascent of rural social services has been in step 
with the conclusion of the 1995 World Summit for Social Development at Copenhagen 
which represented a new consensus on the need to put people at the center of 
development. Today the health, education, and agricultural interest groups in the United 
States and Europe are engaged in a competitive battle for aid resources. Basically these 
pressure groups do not agree that investments in health, education and agriculture are 
complementary investments and that a growing, economic base in rural areas is needed 
for poverty reduction and the long run financial sustainability of rural social services. 
Killick (2004) observes that one of the most striking aspects of the Enhanced Heavily 
Indebted Poor Country debt initiative (hereafter E-HIPC) is its association, under 
pressure from NGOs, with a particular and “narrow approach to the task of reducing 
poverty”, namely, the expansion of spending on social services to the neglect of wider 
growth and developmental priorities.  
The evolution of development practice—state vs. market-led development 
The fifth reason for the overall decline in aid to African agriculture, and the subsectoral 
reallocations within agriculture, is to some extent an outcome of the historical movement 
from state-led development to private-sector-led development, especially during the   
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eighties and seventies (Wolgin 2001). During the sixties and the mid-seventies, state-led 
development stressed the role of the state in actively intervening in and taking over 
strategic economic activities, and monopolistic marketing parastatals were often set up to 
support the expansion of exports by smallholder farmers (Jayne and Jones 1997). By the 
early eighties, the corruption and weaknesses of parastatals were becoming evident, and 
donor support for parastatals began to be withdrawn. During this time the entire state-led 
development approach was denounced in favor of a private-sector-led approach. The 
Berg report (World Bank, 1981) in particular helped initiate this change and also 
provoked the development of the Washington consensus, which prompted the withdrawal 
of the state from many areas that were not related to the provision of narrowly defined 
public goods. Specific actions included removal of regulatory controls in agricultural 
input and output markets, elimination of subsides and tariffs, and reforming or privatizing 
agricultural parastatals and marketing organizations (de-linking of credit, input, and 
output markets) (Dorward et al, 2004). Hence, there was reduced investment by the 
public sector—both the state and the donors—in agriculture. While this may have been 
effective for the few developing countries that have had the infrastructural and 
institutional basis upon which a liberalized agriculture could sustain growth, most 
African countries have lacked this institutional and legal foundation, and, upon 
liberalization, the agricultural sector has floundered. Part of this shift, under structural 
adjustments, to a more market-driven approach, was a movement away from projects to 
simply creating the macroeconomic conditions the reformers considered necessary for the 
private sector to respond. At an extreme, development economics was simply replaced by 
trade theory. 
Changing aid modalities and the resulting marginalization of agriculture  
The sixth reason for the decline in aid to African agriculture is linked to the dramatic 
increase in donor investments in rural social services over the past two decades, including 
health and education, and a concurrent change in aid modality from projects and sector 
aid to structural adjustment and multi-sector aid and budget support and associated 
modalities of debt relief (Killick, 2004).
27 The net effect of the shift to multi-sectoral 
lending and donor pressure to increase aid to rural social services has made it difficult for 
African governments and donors to develop a national agricultural strategy because 
agriculture virtually “disappears” during the transition from project to multi-sectoral   
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programs (Lynam, 2003). This transition helps explain some of the decline in aid to 
African agriculture over the last 15 years. Indeed, Paarlberg and Lipton (1991) argued 
that these early declines in support (due to the transfer of resources from projects to 
structural adjustment) itself led to further declines, as it resulted in fewer staff to identify 
and prepare agricultural projects, this undercutting the performance of projects, and this 
in turn ‘justifying’ a further shift to structural adjustment. 
 
However, simply doubling the percentage of donor aid to social services (from 26 to 55 
percent), and distributing this aid using new types of modalities, has neither generated 
economic growth nor reduced poverty in Africa from 1990 to 2000. In fact, Killick 
(2004) argues that the new aid delivery instruments are unintentionally increasing the 
share of donor aid to social services and reducing aid to production services that are so 
critical to farmers. A recent study of the HIPC (heavily indebted poor countries) found 
that “most recipients consider the focus of the debt relief initiative to be excessive on 
social sectors (on public sector education and health) and too little on growth and wealth 
creation” (Gautam 2003, p45). The empirical evidence on the massive expansion in social 
services in the 1990’s is clear: improved social services cannot transform Africa’s 
agriculture (Evenson 2003). Karen Brooks of the World Bank recently noted that 
although there was a belief in the 1990’s that more emphasis on the social services would 
address poverty effectively, “now there is recognition that measured investment in the 
social sectors is not sufficient to bring growth” (cited in IFPRI, 2004). 
The detrimental effect of policy incoherence 
Policy coherence, in the context of development, is one of the key principles of good 
governance and relates to ensuring that policy choices are internally consistent with one-
another, and in particular do not undermine or contradict development policy. Although 
policy coherence is generally in the interests of all, it remains a function of tradeoffs 
between competing and conflicting interests, and subject to stakeholder power and 
political will. Incoherence generally stems from the benefits of coherence being disbursed 
among many (the 270 million American consumers for instance), yet the costs of being 
concentrated in a few political powerful interest groups (twenty thousand American 
cotton farmers for instance).  
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The two policy areas of high-income countries that have the greatest undermining effects 
of development policies and assistance for African agriculture (and subsequently 
contributing to the decline in assistance itself) are protection for developed country 
producers, and food aid “subscriptions” for African nations. The protection policies, 
including trade barriers and subsidies, for the farmers in industrialized countries directly 
undermine the impacts of the assistance that developed countries provide by depressing 
global commodity prices or increasing the costs of accessing global markets. This 
reduces the competitiveness of developing country producers in international markets, 
and reduces the payoff to development assistance for agriculture, and reduces the 
incentives for donors and African countries to invest in agriculture. In many cases, the 
negative impacts of these policies outweigh the aid flows that developed countries 
provide. For example, cotton provides employment to more than 10 million people in 
Africa and it accounted for 40 to 70 percent of the export earnings of Benin, Burkina 
Faso, and Mali in 2000-2001 (UNCTAD, 2004). But the viability of the cotton industry is 
undermined by the $ 6 billion of support that the United States, EU, and China offered to 
their cotton farmers in 2001-2002. Also, in fiscal year 2002, Mali’s bilateral aid from the 
United States (US$37.5 million) was significantly less than the US$55 million that Mali 
lost through lower world cotton prices as a result of US cotton subsidies (Toure, 2003). 
These factors have led to a precipitous fall in Africa’s share of agriculture trade in 
international markets. Africa’s exports of agricultural products have fallen from 8 percent 
of global exports in 1961 to 2 percent in 2001 (FAOSTAT, 2004).  
 
Competition of Food Aid and Emergency Assistance 
Food aid and emergency assistance represent an important and growing part of aid to 
Africa. Historically relief has been important to Africa, though, quite understandably, 
highly variable given its relationship with volatile and uncertain economic, production 
and social (disease, etc.) shocks.
28 While relief averaged six percent of total aid to Africa 
over the 1990-1992 period, this increased to 9 percent by the 2000-2002 period (Table 
10).
29 This corresponds to an almost doubling in real monetary terms, and an increase 
from two thirds less than the amount of aid allocated to the agriculture sector to 50 
percent more than total aid to agriculture. But food aid and emergency assistance are in 
direct competition in many donor portfolios. For example, the one million tons of U.S. 
food aid to Ethiopia in 2003 is valued at US$ 475 million, a sum larger than the $354   
  23
million of total U.S. aid to agricultural development in all developing countries in 2001 
(Eicher, 2003). While food aid has provided markets for farmers in the North, one 
veteran donor official has described it as “a plague across Africa” because it takes the 
political heat off African heads of state to invest in the agriculture sector as the means to 
address long-term poverty and food security concerns.
30 Inappropriate and poorly 
targeted food aid has increased the need for further relief, and this has then drawn 
resources away from agriculture development (Ruttan 1993). Some donors are now 
realizing that addressing the immediate livelihood needs of the poor is not sufficient, and 
that investments in agriculture are needed to ensure that African countries do not remain 
trapped in a dependency on food aid subscriptions.
31  
Table 10 Food aid and emergency assistance in Africa: 1976-2001 
   1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 
        
Relief as a % of aid to Africa
1 7  11  11  6  9  9 
Agriculture aid as a % of total aid to Africa  20  22  19  13  10  6 
Relief as a % of aid to agriculture  36  50  59  46  87  150 
          
Total Food Aid and Emergency Assistance (million 
2001 $US)  362  959 1,236 775  815 1,492 
        
1Relief includes food aid and emergency relief             
Source: OECD CRS Database        
 
V) CHALLENGES: INCREASING AID TO AFRICAN AGRICULTURE AND 
IMPROVING AID EFFECTIVENESS 
Given this context of aid to agriculture in Africa, and the apparent dichotomy between 
current assistance and the importance of agricultural growth to poverty reduction, six 
important challenges need to be addressed. 
Improving policy coherence 
Mutual accountability (a principle adopted by NEPAD) recognizes that the policies and 
actions of both developed and developing countries have an impact on the effectiveness 
of aid and on the outcomes of development efforts (Picciotti and Weaving 2004). 
Coherence of African countries’ domestic agriculturally related policy is critical for 
improving the effectiveness of aid (World Bank 2002a). Further, it is critical for 
increasing the flow of aid to developing countries given an aid environment in which   
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donors are increasingly turning to (or at least being encouraged to turn to) providing 
assistance to those countries with good policies, and a good track record of maintaining 
and adhering to them (Dollar and Easterly, 1999; Burnside and Dollar 2000). At the 
national level, coherence of policy can be achieved through national agriculture 
development strategies that are integrated into Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSP’s) 
and public expenditure programs. There is a particular need to: i) ensure that 
macroeconomic, labor, environment, competition, and public expenditure policies create 
an investment climate conducive to private sector investments by African smallholder 
farmers (van de Walle and Johnson 1996); ii) avoid excessive taxation of farmers and 
agro-industry that arises from administrative pricing of output, overvalued exchange 
rates, and excessive industrial protection (Cleaver, 2003); and iii) liberalize regulations 
governing within country trade, as well as those regulating participation in international 
markets and the importation of foreign goods and services (developing countries’ own 
liberalization of agriculture and food trade policy could yield gains of an estimated 
US$114 billion (World Bank 2002)). 
 
Critical also is improving policy coherence in developed countries. In many developed 
countries, the department or ministry responsible for development cooperation is 
relatively small and is marginalized from national decision-making processes. It simply 
provides limited funding to developing countries while other ministries such as the 
Ministry of Finance concentrate on promoting employment and growth at home. The 
policy decisions of developed countries often have a greater impact on the development 
of developing countries than the actual ODA itself (the benefits to developing countries 
from liberalization of developed country trade are about six times greater than the current 
flows of ODA to developing countries) (World Bank, 2002). Aside from providing more 
aid to agriculture
32, important areas for action include: 
•  Untying aid. Tied aid is clearly at odds with principles of economic efficiency and 
with liberalization of trade and investment regulations. Tied aid may increase 
procurement costs by 15-30 percent (CIDA, 2003). Yet about 30 percent of total 
ODA remains tied (Boone, 1996).  
•  Redress the imbalance between assistance for agriculture development and that for 
emergency relief and improve the quality of food aid delivered such that is does not 
undermine agricultural development efforts.    
  25
•  Reducing protection of domestic producers (both trade barriers (tariff and non-tariff 
measures) and domestic support). On average, prices received by OECD farmers 
were 31 percent above world prices, and almost one-third of total farm receipts 
originated from government programs in 2001 (OECD 2002). The estimated annual 
gain to developing countries from liberalization of agriculture and food by high-
income countries is more than US$30 billion (World Bank 2002)
33. Technical, 
sanitary, environmental, labor and other standards imposed by the governments of 
importing countries are also important to the extent that these can block access to 
markets when implementation is not founded on good science. 
•  Investment policies must also be complementary to development policies. 
Development finance institutions and export credit agencies have a bearing on the 
flows of private investment to developing countries. While these agencies have a 
mandate to promote development, there is often expectation that they will promote 
the interest of the home country—and there is frequently tension between the two. 
Policies that more strongly emphasis the development component relative to domestic 
interests, would go a long way to stimulating and catalyzing greater private flows to 
developing countries.
34  
Building Institutional Perquisites for Agricultural Growth and a Market Economy 
A move to market-led liberalization of agriculture, and reducing state expenditures on 
public goods such as agricultural research and extension and increasing investments in 
NGOs have failed to achieve the targeted 5 to 6 percent aggregate agricultural growth 
rate. Various explanations of this failure range from an incomplete liberalization process 
in which reforms have been only partial or made with little government commitment (and 
have often backtracked), to weaknesses in the institutional arrangements and the failure 
of scattered NGO projects to achieve an aggregate national impact (White & Eicher 
1999). Perhaps more relevant to Africa is an under-appreciation of the role of the state in 
being the risk taker and entrepreneur in crafting new agricultural institutions and 
investing in physical infrastructure to serve small holders at Africa’s early stage of 
development (Mosley 2002). For example, while there is a cry to boost fertilizer use in 
Africa, Jayne et al (2003) have shown that 50 percent or more of the farm gate price of 
fertilizer in Kenya, Ethiopia and Zambia is attributable to marketing and transport costs. 
Large state investments in physical infrastructure are needed to drive down transport   
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costs. Gordon Conroy (2004) recently emphasized the need for massive investment in 
roads in Africa by pointing out that the price of urea (fertilizer) delivered to farmers is 
US$90/ton in Europe, $200/ton in India, $300 in China, and $400 in Mozambique and in 
Western Kenya. 
 
Although agricultural liberalization may have been beneficial in poor countries with good 
infrastructure, diversified agriculture, and a diversified rural economy, and in lower-
middle income countries in which production of staples has ceased to be the basis of the 
livelihoods of the majority of the poor (Kydd and Dorward, 2003), most countries in 
Africa have not had this institutional foundation to support a successful liberalization 
agenda. Where agricultural transformations have led to widespread and rapid pro-poor 
growth (as in much of Asia during the Green Revolution), state-led investment (in both 
infrastructure and research and extension, and in the institutional arrangements for input 
supply, price stabilization, and farm finance) have been substantial (Fan and Rao 2003). 
 
In most of Africa, there is a major deficiency in finance, input, and output markets, let 
alone the basic infrastructure (roads and irrigation for instance) and research and 
extension systems to speed the adoption of modern technologies. These are all areas in 
which public good elements warrant public goods investments. While there have been 
many misdirected state investments in state farms, (parastatals, and fertilizer subsidies), 
there have been some notable successes in smallholder cotton, horticultural and dairy 
production (Haggblade 2003). Smale & Jayne (2003) have pointed out the benefits of 
reducing government investments in state operated grain marketing boards, yet subsidies 
for fertilizer, roads, research, power, and credit in India have had large payoffs in both 
economic and poverty reduction terms (Fan et al, 2004). Likewise, there have been 
comparable results from public investment in China’s agriculture sector.  
 
Zimbabwe’s rain-fed smallholder maize revolution of the early eighties was a public 
sector-led success story par excellence with regard to crafting an interlocking system of 
agricultural service institutions at Zimbabwe’s early stage of development (Eicher 1995). 
The public sector developed an impressive all-weather road network, it funded maize 
research for 28 years (1932-1960) that led to the development of hybrid maize varieties, 
and it has been instrumental in extension and seed distribution. Zimbabwe’s experience   
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highlights the strategic importance of an active government role in the early stage of 
development because it is unlikely that private traders will deliver research, extension 
and credit services to smallholders, especially to those in remote areas. To be sure, the 
private sector slowly took on a greater role in maize breeding and seed distribution and 
marketing (Rusike & Eicher 1997).  However, the maize output boom of the 1980s 
faltered in Zimbabwe in the 1990s partially because of the unsustainable maize price 
subsidies for consumers (Smale and Jayne 2003) and the political chaos that engulfs 
today. 
 
To summarize, even after the public sector has crafted the architecture for a modern 
agriculture, public sector involvement can be required to the extent that markets need to 
be ‘kick-started’. That is, government interventions can be needed to develop new 
technology, provide market information about national regional and global market trends, 
and enable farmers to access input and output markets at low cost and low risk (Dorward 
et al, 2004).  
Mobilizing African political support for long term investments in agriculture 
The starting point in rebuilding donor confidence in investing in African agriculture is 
mobilizing African political commitment to a long term agricultural development 
strategy. Mobilizing domestic public sector support for agricultural development, 
requires African demand for donor investment in agriculture as well as effective 
agriculture development strategies supported by correspondingly high budgetary 
allocations. The current levels of investing 3 to 6 percent of the public investment in 
agriculture are woefully inadequate. In India during the green revolution from 1970 to 
1990, public expenditure in rural areas increased twofold, growing at a rate of 13 percent 
in the 1970’s alone (Fan, Thorat, and Rao 2004). Malaysia spent 26.5 percent of its 
government budget on agriculture during the Second Plan from 1971-1975. Redressing 
the African ‘bias against agriculture’ and mobilizing budgetary resources will require a 
political commitment to agriculture.  
 
In securing aid, it is becoming increasingly important that African governments improve 
the macroeconomic policy environment, given that donors are going to be more selective 
in choosing which countries to aid in light of evidence that assistance performance is   
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highly conditioned by the policy environment (Dollar and Easterly, 1999). This 
selectivity principle, however, is not universally appropriate because in countries where it 
is not feasible to improve policies, it may well be feasible and desirable to use aid to 
support other elements of a development strategy, including long-run investments in 
social and physical infrastructure and institutional development (Tarp and Hjertholm, 
2000). The policy environment similarly affects the effectiveness of government flows, 
and in this regard, the policy environment itself may be the binding constraint in many 
countries rather than any claims of an ‘investment gap’ (OPM, 2002).  
 
But is hope on the horizon? The recent activities of NEPAD have shown that there is now 
growing agreement between African leaders and the development community on the need 
to increase investment in agriculture.
35 In July 2003, African heads of state met in 
Maputo and agreed to raise public spending in agriculture from the current Africa-wide 
average of 6 percent to 10 percent of their total budgets over the next five years. The 
Ugandan government has progressed from 1 percent in 2000 to 3 percent of public 
expenditure on agriculture in fiscal year 2003-04 (Museveni, 2004). It seems plausible 
that the approach of African leaders is now sufficiently aligned with that of the 
international development community, and that the global political and economic 
environment is ‘favorable’ (i.e., that changes in the global political economy have made 
reformist ideas more acceptable), so that successful ‘cooperative’ outcomes can be 
achieved (Owusu, 2003). 
Mobilizing donor support for agricultural growth  
Several donors are renewing their commitment to agricultural development (World Bank, 
2002,2003; USAID 2003; CIDA, 2003; DFID, 2002) but the extent to which they appear 
to be prepared to back their ‘renewed appreciation for agriculture’ with increased 
financial flows to the sector appears mixed. Significant political and structural constraints 
on increasing donor flows to agriculture and coordination must be urgently addressed 
(Wangwe 1997). One problem contributing to poor performance of past aid has been the 
domestic and bureaucratic political environment that influences donors’ allocative and 
policy decisions. Without question, decision-making is usually influenced by what is 
required by their own public and domestic political concerns, personal relationships, their 
legislature, and their bureaucracy (Ruttan, 1996). Further, emphasis remains on the   
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politically encumbered issues, rather than on achieving results from spending; there exists 
an imperative to spend available funds within given time periods, and this has major 
implications for allocation decisions and the quality of investment outcomes (Lancaster, 
1999). In this regard, donor incentives are grounded in achieving a large transfer of 
resources, and showing that resources go to the priority areas of the donors (Ali et al., 
1999). There is a need to develop incentive frameworks that encourage donors to deliver 
impacts and not just show that funds have been dispersed to the areas with which their 
political constituencies are most concerned—that is, rewarding for quality distributions. 
 
The development experience in Asia and Latin America has shown there is a large pay 
off to investing in pilot projects that can serve as “knowledge generators” on how to 
design and implement long run (10 to 25 year) investments in building a functioning 
system of core agricultural institutions (Rukuni et al. 1998). Yet there is a large gap 
between theory and practice on this critical issue. For example, after two years of 
negotiations, a bilateral donor recently agreed to finance a conservation farming project 
in southern Africa for an initial three year period, with a provision that it would be 
renewed for an additional two years if results can be achieved by the end of year three. 
Since conservation farming is a new type of natural resource management, it follows that 
this type of project should be designed to cover a 12 to 15 year period with a three-to-
five-year pilot project followed by scaling up, depending on the results of on-going 
evaluation.  
Turning to strengthening national agricultural research systems in the 48 countries in 
Africa, the conventional wisdom is that long-term funding is needed to craft and nurture 
institutional innovations. However, in practice one finds that discontinuities of project aid 
are severely undermining the accretionary model of institution building. Table 11 
illustrates the discontinuities in using short-term donor projects to build African research 
capacity to carry out research on cassava (Africa’s second most important food staple) 
and sweet potatoes in Eastern and Southern Africa. The table illustrates how research 
network offices have been closed and reopened and scientists laid off and new scientists 
hired. The transaction costs of this approach to capacity building are horrific.   
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Table 11. The Discontinuities inherent in using Donor Projects to Support Cassava and 




IITA (The International Institute of Tropical Agriculture) established an Eastern and 
Southern Africa Root and Tuber Network (ESARRN) with USAID as the main donor. 
IDRC financed some bilateral research projects (e.g. Malawi). 
 
1993  IDRC bilateral funding to Malawi was terminated. From 1989 to 1994, an FAO breeder 
with UNDP funding strengthened the Malawi national root crops program.  
 
1994  USAID office in Malawi and later its Regional Office - RCSA - helped establish the 
Southern Africa Root Crops Research Network (SARRNET). SARRNET was managed 
by IITA and it had one internationally recruited scientist (IRS) for each of the following 
countries: Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique.  
 
1996  USAID/OFDA (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) financed an emergency food 
recovery program for cassava and sweet potato with one IRS based in Zimbabwe. 
1998  Due to the termination of funding and the end of phase 1 of SARRNET, the IRS 
positions in Tanzania and Zambia were terminated and the SARRNET office was closed 
in Zambia. 
 
2000  SARRNET launched phase 2 with one IRS for Tanzania and a new SARRNET 
Coordinator based in Malawi. 
 
2001  USAID/OFDA assistance was terminated and the SARRNET office was closed in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
2001  Regional USAID support was terminated in Mozambique and the SARRNET office was 
converted to a bilateral office with support from USAID Mozambique. 
 
2003   SARRNET Phase II was completed in August and the IRS position was terminated in 
Tanzania. 
 
2004  SARRNET Coordinator position and regional activities are supported by regional funds 
from the U.S. Presidential initiative to end hunger in Africa (IEHA), with emphasis on 
Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi until August 2004. It is planned to increase the 
number of countries and SARRNET activities over the 2004 to 2010 period.  
 
Despite the shortcoming of small projects which Morss (1984) flagged two decades ago, 
some donors still prefer small projects. For example, between 2000 and 2002, aid 
agencies in rich countries committed to funding 1,371 different projects in Tanzania. 
Switzerland committed US$ 29.7 million of aid through 5 projects whereas Ireland 
offered roughly the same amount of total aid to Tanzania through 404 different projects 
(Ranking the Rich 2004). 
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Rethinking aid modalities for agriculture  
Agriculture sector analyses and studies were supported by donors in the 1960’s and 
1970’s, and these often provided the framework for designing, implementing, and 
coordinating agricultural projects.
36 By the late 1970s, the ‘project’ was favored for its 
visibility to the recipient and the donor, its relatively technological simplicity, and its 
ability to transfer knowledge and institutions that already exist (Lancaster, 1999). 
However, doubts emerged about the large procurement and reporting requirements of 
projects and the imposition of tying requirements, on local capacity. And the economic 
crisis in Africa and associated debt defaults by the 1980’s forced donors to reconsider the 
effectiveness of projects. Programmatic aid (including structural adjustment and sectoral 
adjustment) emerged; these enabled quick-disbursing financial resources that could 
theoretically promote policy change while supposedly building policy capacity of the 
recipient government (funds are distributed over time on the basis of compliance with 
policy conditions). Program aid also enabled foreign aid to support balance of payments 
to those governments committed to economic reform based on the neoclassical economic 
vision of free markets and minimal government intervention. Structural adjustment 
mechanisms typically do not control how funds are spent within sectors and thus have 
had little effect in promoting long-term sectoral objectives, while sectoral adjustment 
mechanisms themselves have not necessarily translated into better outputs and 
performance because they focus almost exclusively on increased finance for the sector 
(World Bank 2001). Neither of these programmatic approaches has increased 
expenditures for the agriculture sector.  
 
Given the perceived ineffectiveness of project and programmatic approaches, and the 
greater emphasis on governance quality, sector wide approaches emerged in the 1990’s 
as a means of promoting recipient responsibility for the preparation and implementation 
of programs to be supported, and for ensuring effective coordination of donor inputs    
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(World Bank 2001). Similarly, budgetary support and debt relief have increasingly been 
adopted (or at least promoted by the plethora of literature on the topic) over the last 
decade. Together, these enable taking a multisectoral, ‘demand-driven’ approach. The 
shift is also in part a response to the growing view that conditionality does not work and 
that ownership is required for successful outcomes. What’s more, they also have, in 
theory at least, fewer transaction costs (and so are, in theory at least, likely to be more 
efficient at delivering aid).
37 These tools have become increasingly adopted by donors 
given the emergence of PRSP’s as a way of prioritizing, coordinating and harmonizing 
the efforts (including debt relief) of stakeholders.
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Lynam (2003) argues that agriculture virtually disappears” in the transition from project 
to sectoral and multi-sectoral programs and budgetary support type of modalities. 
However, data on the use of these new modalities remains incomplete and fragmented for 
various reasons, including differing classifications among donors (for example, what is 
the distinction between a ‘project’ and ‘program’), and few incentives for accurate and 
complete reporting of the types of instruments used for the implementation of various aid 
activities. There is a clear need to better evaluate how much aid is distributed through 
each modality, for what purposes (including the sectoral allocation) and to what extent 
and in what ways modality choice effects aid performance. 
Learning from experience and monitoring and evaluating aid effectiveness  
Given that it is possible that the ‘failure’ of many past agricultural initiatives contributed 
to a decline in the allocation of funding to agricultural development, one might consider 
that it would be important to have a robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system in 
place if decisions on resource allocation (among and within sectors) are to be based at all 
on past performance. However, donors do not seem to have reached this conclusion.
39 
Likewise, given the changing mechanisms through which aid is allocated and delivered, 
there must be a corresponding change in the methodology of M&E. Mutual donor-
recipient review of development effectiveness is increasingly being promoted and so 
‘there are fairly strong moves towards establishing aid relationships based on 
‘partnership’ which implies co-equality and mutual acceptance of responsibilities’ 
(Killick, 2004a).  
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There is considerable difference between donors’ monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms-not only how they are implemented, but more importantly the criteria used 
as a basis for measuring the likes of ‘success’ or ‘sustainability’ and the comparability of 
results. Though it would be a large step for the adoption of a universal framework upon 
which all donors could report outcomes and impacts, the development of the DAC 
“Evaluations Abstracts” website is a step in the right direction.
40  
The issues and challenges examined in this paper have specific implications for agencies 
with data management mandates and generally relate to improving the tracking of aid 
flows in a changing aid environment. Current data limitations constrain our 
understanding of what is happening and also limit our capacity to make more informed 
decisions on the allocations of aid, both in terms of the relative quantities allocated to 
various countries, sectors, and sub-sectors, as well as the form of aid provided and the 
delivery mechanisms used. Areas for further research and potential action as they relate 
to the issues above, include:
41 
 
•  First is a need for a better accounting of the actual flows to agriculture, improving the 
coverage ratios of the DAC countries contributing data, and designing improved 
mechanisms for capturing the flows of non-DAC countries. This might lead to a 
standard schema (with regards to the definitions of sectors, sub-sectors, and 
modalities) that all donors are able and willing to comply with.  
•  There is also a need for more information on the relative effectiveness of flows and 
the relative payoffs or returns to aid delivered to different sectors to allow cross-
sectoral comparisons.
42 
•  There is also a need for DAC to cooperate and coordinate its database with poverty 
tracking systems (UN/WDI) and FAO/OECD data collection initiatives.  
•  While it is invariably difficult to ‘measure’ ‘capacity’, it is becoming increasingly 
important to track flows and effectiveness of public expenditures to build agricultural 
science bases and regional knowledge hubs in Africa.   
•  There are numerous elements of ‘policy coherence’ that are to some extent 
measurable (tariffs, proportion of ODA tied, subsidies, etc), and there must be better 
monitoring (and publicizing) of the compliance of developed (and developing) 
countries to relevant commitments and agreements.
43  
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A logical outcome of these actions might be a more transparent aid delivery and 
performance tracking system that clearly shows the relative performance of different 
donors (‘the number of poor that they reduced this year relative to their GDP’, for 
instance) and illustrates this visibly in arenas where public global sentiment is influenced.  
VI) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has found that aid to agriculture in Africa has fallen dramatically over the last 
decade, while at the same time aid to social services and food aid and emergency relief 
has increased substantially. Between 1991 and 2001, the share of aid to agriculture in 
Africa fell from 19 to 10 percent, while that of social services (i.e., health and education) 
increased from 32 to 56 percent. As agriculture lost support among development 
organizations, both in absolute and relative terms, poverty in Africa has persisted and, 
unlike other regions that have made major advances in agricultural productivity to 
improve the livelihoods of the poorest, Africa has regressed on a number of fronts. Yet 
the role of agriculture in food security and poverty alleviation is no less important in 
Africa than it was in Asian’s food crisis of the 1960’s and 1970’s. 
 
What explains the decline? The sharp cutback in donor aid to African agriculture since 
the early nineties can be partially attributed to donor frustration over three decades of the 
poor performance of many donor-financed agricultural projects (e.g., credit, T&V 
extension, livestock ranches and government grain marketing boards). In addition most 
African governments have given low priority to agriculture and did not demand increased 
donor support for agriculture. Also, agricultural subsidies and protectionism in industrial 
countries have reduced world food prices and undermined African food 
production/security initiatives. In addition many NGOs have been influential in making 
the case for investments in rural social services. There is a need for African governments 
to provide an incentive environment that encourages farmers, donors and the private 
sector to invest in agriculture and raise agricultural productivity, a sine qua non for a 
major attack on rural poverty. 
 
To be sure, it is encouraging that NEPAD and a number of major donors and NGOs have 
reordered their priorities and put agriculture back on the agenda because of the realization 
that rural social services, food aid and post-conflict aid may keep people alive but they do   
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not increase crop yields and earnings capacity – the keys to mass poverty alleviation. 
Without question, donors should increase their investments in the prime movers (human 
capital, technology and institutional innovations) to increase farm production and 
accelerate agricultural growth. Looking ahead, it is clear that the transformation of 
African agriculture at this stage of Africa’s economic history will have to be public-
sector led. Donor assistance can play a constructive role in supporting the transformation 
over the coming 20 to 30 years. 
 
The Time Frame – One of the strategic issues that has for been sidestepped by most 
donors is the increase in the share of aid to Africa that is spent on food aid and 
emergency assistance to keep Africans alive amid the reduction of aid for long term 
investments in roads, research and human capital. A recent example flags this dilemma. 
In Malawi in 2003, USAID allocated $39 million for food aid and emergency assistance 
and only $3.4 million in investment in the agricultural sector (USAID 2004). And in 
Ethiopia in 2003, the U.S. delivered one million tons of U.S. food aid valued at US$475 
million; a sum larger than the $354 million of total U.S. aid to agricultural development 
in all developing countries in the world in 2001 (USAID 2003a). Feeding Africa today is 
important but what can be done to help Africans feed themselves down the road? Clearly 
annual food aid subscriptions are not the answer to breaking the cycle of poverty and 
dependence. Now that NEPAD, CIDA, SIDA, the World Bank, DFID and USAID and a 
few NGOs are starting to put agriculture back on the aid agenda, who will address 
strategic questions such as who will build the rural roads and agricultural universities that 
India and Brazil built some 40 years ago? 
 
The role of African countries - Much of the strategic investments needed to get 
agriculture moving entails public good investments in roads, research, extension and 
building an agricultural science base in a diverse continent seven times larger than India. 
Investment is needed in physical infrastructure, including roads and communication 
systems to link farmers with markets, in research and development to improve the 
productivity of local farmers, and in land security, education and training, and irrigation. 
Improved African commitment (communicated through increased public expenditure) is 
of growing importance given that donors are increasingly allocating aid on a ‘demand-
driven’ basis and increasingly channeling aid through the client’s own budgetary   
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accounts. Reform of the macro-economic policies that are biased against agriculture, 
trade, taxation, labor, and environment in particular is also a challenge that must be 
confronted by African countries.  
 
The role of donors – What can be done by donors to reverse the declining support for 
agriculture? Resolving this issue will necessitate rethinking the blanket application of 
market liberalization, privatization and the use of rural social services to combat rural 
poverty. It will also necessitate rethinking the modalities used to deliver aid. Project aid 
was slashed because of concerns regarding implementation and compliance costs and the 
fragmentation of donor effort. More recently there has been a movement away from 
programmatic lending because of conditionality ineffectiveness and ownership problems. 
The now fashionable approach is budgetary support or its equivalencies, though recent 
evidence is shedding light on some problems with this. It is time to reconsider the 
modalities used to deliver aid. It may well be that well targeted aid to agriculture that is 
delivered as regular projects (such as the World Bank’s new 12 year Kenya Agricultural 
Productivity Project) is more effective than budgetary support.  Whatever the outcome of 
future studies of aid modalities, a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to 
agricultural lending must be adopted. A key question is the following: Who is going to 
develop a national agricultural strategy for each of the 48 countries in Africa? It has to be 
Africans themselves. This in turn will require a huge increase in capacity strengthening. 
This is a monumental task because of the need to take account of the path dependence of 
the dominant colonial histories.  The challenge is to coordinate investments and assure 
the inclusion of agricultural strategies in country assistance and poverty reduction 
strategies for each of the 48 countries in Africa. This task will have to be approached at 
the sub-regional level because neither donors nor African governments have the financial 
resources to build 48 biotech labs – one for each of the 48 countries in Africa. It is clear 
that regional public goods investments cannot easily be incorporated into county level 
PRSPs.  
 
The role of DAC countries - The trade and protection policies of DAC countries have 
reduced the competitiveness of African farmers, and this in turn directly contributed to 
the decline in aid to agriculture by reducing the payoff to investments in agriculture 
development. Developing countries could benefit by 30 billion dollars from trade   
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liberalization in developed countries between now and 2015, and developed countries 
themselves would benefit by 144 billion dollars. Despite the failure of the Cancun round, 
the WTO is in an influential position to encourage reform to ensure that the domestic 
policies of developed countries are better aligned with development policy. Similarly, 
policies for allocating and delivering food aid must be more coherent with development 
policies. No longer should developed countries deliver relief that while visible to their 
home constituencies and while providing short-term life support for African people, 
undermines the development of incentives for development of efficient crop production 
and food distribution systems.   
 
In rising to these challenges, there needs to be better tracking of aid flows such that better 
decisions can be made on the allocation and delivery of assistance. New indicators of 
policy coherences, better measures of the relative effectiveness of aid to different sectors, 
comprehensive reporting of public expenditures (broken down by sectors and subsectors), 
and a better understanding of the relative effectiveness of different aid modalities, are all 







                                                 
1 See Johnston and Mellor (1961) for an explanation of the important roles of agriculture in development.  In 
Africa, Thirtle, et. al., (2002) have shown that for every one unit increase in crop yields, there is a corresponding 
0.72 unit decrease in poverty (this comparing to 0.48 in both East and South Asia, and 0.10 in Latin America).  
2 Aid to agriculture is defined to comprise agricultural sector policy, planning and programmes, agricultural land 
and water resources, agricultural development and supply of inputs, crops and livestock production, agricultural 
services, agricultural education, training and research as well as institution capacity building and advice. Forestry 
and fishing are also included (identified as separate sectors from 1996 onwards). This definition of agriculture 
excludes rural development (classifieds as multi-sector aid) and developmental food aid (a sub-category of 
general programme assistance). It follows that DAC statistics on aid to agriculture only relate to activities which 
have agriculture as their main purpose and fail to capture aid to agriculture delivered within multi-sector   
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programmes. Aid to agriculture through NGOs may also be excluded, since his is not always sector coded in as 
much detail as project and programme aid. 
3 Aid and assistance are used interchangeably in this paper. Official development assistance (ODA) is defined 
here as those flows to developing country recipients that are provided by official agencies, including state and 
local governments, or by their executing agencies, and each transaction of which: a) is administered with the 
promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is 
concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25% (calculated at a discount rate of 10 per 
cent). The definition of aid here excludes “other official flows” that are either not primarily aimed at 
development, or do not have a grant element greater than 25 per cent. Okedokun (2003) reports that about 98 
percent of ODA during the 1991-2000 period was provided by members of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the OECD. DAC is the donor organization responsible for monitoring aid performance.  
Currently 22 (high-income countries) are members of DAC. 
4 CRS is the DAC’s aid activity database. It contains information on financial flows for official development 
assistance and provides a set of basic data on where aid goes and what purposes it serves.  
5 The four limitations of the use of CRS data are:  
a) The CRS generally reports commitments whereas the main concern is finding out how much funding actually 
flows to the agriculture sector of developing countries rather than the amount that donors ‘commit’. While in 
theory actual disbursements should equal the commitments made, there are generally discrepancies between the 
two with fewer funds being disbursed than committed because of cancellations. There is also less data reported to 
CRS because of reluctance on behalf of the donors to make the extra effort required to collect and report 
commitment (rather than disbursement) data that must be provided at a more detailed level.  
b) CRS statistics on aid to agriculture only relate to activities that have agriculture as their main purpose. 
However, there are inevitably some agriculture activities or elements in other codes, and likewise some non-
agricultural elements in the agriculture classification. To what extent agricultural components of programmatic 
approaches and multisectoral projects are captured accurately, is questionable.  
c) Coverage of aid flows is generally incomplete and varies by donor and by year. Different donors have 
different reporting practices, and often agencies use their own classification and coding systems. These can be 
difficult to reconcile across agencies.  
d) The data generally relate only to the flow of aid as an input to development—they say nothing of the outputs 
attained for each input. That is, no insight is gleaned as to the relative degree of aid effectiveness among sectors, 
donors, or delivery mechanisms, nor changes across time. 
6 OECD maintains a database (the ‘DAC database’) that provides annual aggregated statistics on the volume, 
origin and types of aid and other resource flows. But it is not appropriate for this analysis, because it does not 
permit sectoral analysis at the country/regional level. The next best alterative may have been detailed analysis 
directly drawing from the records and resources of a number of individual donors, however, this is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
7 ODA and aid are used interchangeability throughout this paper. 
8 Brautigam (2004) and Knack (2004) report that more than half the countries in sub-Saharan Africa have 
experienced significant political instability since independence, including civil war and coups.   
9 Unless otherwise specified, the source of in-text citations is the OECD CRS database.   
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10 For example, the private sector accounts for only 10 percent of all agricultural research in developing 
countries, and it is assumed to be less than this in Africa (Pray, 2002); Beintema and Stads 2004). 
11 These changes are consistent with those at the global level (social infrastructure having risen from 20 to 48 
percent and multisectoral having increased from 6 to 12 percent of total sector allocable aid from 1975 to 2000). 
12 For instance, the largest recipient of aid in Africa in 2000 was Ghana, a country with a per capita GDP 
considerably higher than that of the regional average and a population considerably smaller than many other 
countries in Africa. 
13 This includes agricultural sector policy, planning and programmes; aid to agricultural ministries; institution 
capacity building and advice; unspecified agriculture. 
14 To the extent that programmatic lending is associated with an increasing share of agriculture aid reported as 
“unspecified agriculture”, there will be some degree of bias in the trends reported here. 
15 For example, while Africa’s imports of cereals equated to only 6 percent of domestic production in 1961, 
imports equated to 25 percent of production in 2001. (Exports equated to 46 percent of imports in 1961 and to 3 
percent in 2001) (FAOSTAT, 2004). 
16 See Eicher 2003 for more details. 
17 These are transactions by the official sector that do not meet the conditions for eligibility as Official 
Development Assistance, either because they are not primarily aimed at development, or because they have a 
Grant Element of less than 25 percent. 
18 Also, data from non-DAC donors is significant though excluded from the analysis thus far. In 2002, total ODA 
from non-DAC donors equated to slightly less than 5 percent of the total ODA provided by DAC donors, though 
in previous years this contribution has been significantly less (DAC, 2004). Given that this aid from non-DAC 
countries is likely to increase, an important challenge for the DAC will be to continue to monitor these flows 
effectively, and perhaps include/integrate with existing DAC data this will, of course, require reporting to the 
same level of detail to enable comparability.  
19 For example, in the 1960’s there were three major agencies providing aid to agriculture in India: the Ford 
Foundation (agricultural extension); the Rockefeller Foundation (agricultural research); and USAID (agricultural 
higher education and training). Today the typical developing country is assisted by around 25 donor agencies. 
20 There are insufficient data on public resource flows in African countries. DAC could play an important role in 
promoting more accurate and thorough public sector accounting and reporting (Cook and Sachs, 1999). This will 
become increasingly important given the increasing resources transferred through budgetary support, and it must 
encompass ‘what’ was financed, and how ‘effective’ were the expenditures. 
21 Africa was a modest net food exporter in the 1960’s. 
22 See Staatz and Eicher (1998) for a discussion of the change in thinking about agriculture’s role in 
development.  
23 Paarlberg and Lipton (1991) note, however, that for the World Bank at least, while the proportion of failed 
projects was relatively high, the proportion of failed lending was no higher than that of lending in other sectors—
the projects that failed were relatively small and inexpensive. 
24 Cleaver (2003) reports that “the World Bank only had a 60 percent success rate with agriculture projects in the 
1980’s and early 1990’s; similar to that for other donors”.   
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25 Lending for irrigation projects is a good example. For the first time in the past 40 years the World Bank did not 
lend any money for irrigation (world wide) in 2003 because it had a hard time finding a rate of return on 
irrigation investment greater than 10 percent at current world agricultural prices. In addition, the proposed 
irrigation projects often had social and environmental problems.  
26 Nweke, Spencer and Lynam (2002). 
27 Donor aid to social services in Africa increased from 26 percent in 1990 to 55 percent in 2000. A recent World 
Bank study of 13 heavily indebted poor countries found that there was a close association between the expansion 
of spending on social services and an almost corresponding decline in the share of aid for production services in 
countries participating in EHIPC (Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Country) schemes (Gautam 2003). Similarly, 
Killick (2004) recently examined the choices of modalities and found that donor expenditure on rural social 
services is increasing in many countries while public expenditure on agriculture and core infrastructure is 
decreasing.   
28 The definition of ‘relief’ includes food aid/food security programmes (supply of edible human food under 
national or international programmes, including transport costs; cash payments made for food supplies; project 
food aid; and food aid for market sales) and emergency assistance (all emergency, distress relief and 
humanitarian aid; disaster preparedness; food aid normally for general free distribution or special supplementary 
feeding programmes; short term relief to targeted population groups affected by emergency situations; and aid to 
refugees (in recipient countries) including internally displaced people). 
29 That a greater proportion of food aid and emergency relief is provided by bilateral agencies than multilateral 
agencies might indicate the political motivations of food aid delivery (for instance, in 2001 bilateral agencies 
delivered 81 percent of all food aid and emergency assistance, yet they only delivered 64 percent of aid to 
agriculture).  
30 T.W. Schultz (1983) made this same point during Asia’s food crisis of a generation ago. 
31 The FAO has recognized that a ‘twin-track’ approach is necessary to improve the immediate livelihoods of the 
poor and offer substantial investments to get agriculture moving and alleviate the need for assistance of any sort 
(relief or development) in the long-term (FAO, 2003). 
32 Rosegrant et al. (2001) estimate that given the current ‘baseline scenario’, the number of malnourished 
children in Africa will increase by 18 percent to 39 million by 2020. By increasing investments in agriculture by 
76 million USD, and achieving an annual crop yield growth rate of only 3 percent, child malnutrition in Africa 
could be reduced by one third over the same time period. 
33 Developed countries themselves would benefit by an estimated US$ 144 billion (in 1997 prices) upon 
liberalization of their trade policies (and by a further US$ 53 billion upon liberalization of the policies of 
developing countries) (World Bank, 2002). 
34 Two other challenges will be reforming domestic competition policy (especially in light of the consolidation in 
agriculture and the concentration of power in large agribusinesses), and enabling the transfer of knowledge, 
technologies and resources that can most help farmers (seeds, GMOs, technology, fertilizers). Because of 
developed country legislation (including patents, etc.) and barriers to information flows in general, developing-
country producers have limited access to advanced (and in many cases even basic) scientific knowledge. 
35 NEPAD and the World Bank’s approach ‘… exhibit an amazing consensus over the cause of the continent’s 
underdevelopment, what should be the focus of development policy and how to achieve development’ (Owusu,   
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2003 p. 1660). Further, NEPAD’s commitment to agriculture has been strongly endorsed by the Comprehensive 
Africa Agriculture Development Programme in which the importance of agriculture to African development is 
forcefully articulated, and the specific investment needs (both domestic and international) to realize the potential 
of the agriculture sector are spelled out (NEPAD, 2002). However, this is a new initiative, and though off to a 
positive start, it faces many hurdles before any substantial impacts are achieved. 
36 See Johnson et al. (1969) for an agricultural and rural development strategy for Nigeria that was prepared by a 
large team over a three-year period. There has been a slippage in donor support for this type of sectoral work, 
and a decline in its quality, over recent years in Africa. 
37 Ali et al, (1999) note that the form of aid and the mechanisms used to deliver it have tended to make local 
administrative and political processes beholden to external constituencies. 
38 The Poverty Reduction Support Credit used by the World Bank is one specific form of budgetary support that 
has been developed, as a means to implement the Country Assistance Strategy. The Highly Indebted Poor 
Country scheme (HICP) is another prominent framework for administering assistance in Africa—its principle 
objective being the reduction of debt (to ‘sustainable’ levels). 
39 CDD (Community Driven Development) and CBRD (Community Based Development Projects) approaches 
are flourishing, despite there being no solid empirical basis for these projects. A concerted effort must be made to 
critically examine their effectiveness (Mansuri and Rao 2004). 
40 See http://www.dac-evaluations-cad.org/dac/  
41 An overriding task of DAC Statistics will be balancing the value of improved data quality (in terms of its 
incremental potential to increase aid effectiveness, both within the sector, and allocative efficiency among 
sectors) and the incremental costs of increasing data quality.  
42 Not only should this relate to the sectors, sub-sectors, and specific activities for which aid is allocated, but to 
the modalities used. “It is crucial in evaluating the effectiveness of aid programs to distinguish failures of the aid 
process from failures of overall development strategy. One can distinguish two kinds of aid failure: aid strategy 
and aid delivery” (Tarp et al., 2000). Also see Riddell (1999). 
43 For instance, at the G8 Summit of 2001, donors committed to untie forms of aid other than food aid, free-
standing technical cooperation, and management services arrangements. In coming years DAC will play an 
important role in monitoring compliance with this agreement. Also, the specific policy-related commitments 
made in relation to the MDGs and the Monterrey Consensus are rather vague and generally represent soft policy 
statements; “… targets seem more like statements of good intentions rather than clear commitments to action” 
(Grieg-Gran, 2003). A recent OECD Policy Brief recognizes the OECD as being well-placed to integrate 
developmental with other policy considerations due to its analytical capacity and the horizontal nature of is work; 
“a combination of concrete analysis of the impacts of OECD country policies in the priority areas on developing 
countries, policy recommendations—including identification of policy alternatives—and building the will for 
reform are needed”. It goes on to commit OECD to do so “… OECD’s analytical work will seek measures by 
which progress can be monitored on a regular basis” (OECD, 2003a). Kane/Eicher: Aid to African Agriculture    
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